D. What Is To Be Done?
There should be no doubt that the law must respond to the changes taking place in photography.
(273) Even we if cannot ascertain to what degree, what was once the work of mavericks, "technically difficult, time-consuming,
and outside the mainstream of photographic practice,"
(274) is now widely obtainable.
(275) One no longer needs a darkroom to develop a photograph,
(276) or, more significantly, to manipulate its data sequence.
(277) Commentators have noted the potential for abuse: "An interlude of false innocence has passed."
(278) Treatises recognized by the early 1990s that although changes in cameras and recording materials could aid in the use of
photographic evidence, they were also fraught with problems.
(279) Because "[o]bjects within a picture can be shifted around or eliminated and other objects from another picture inserted,
without creating any doubt that the picture depicts reality . . . it will often be necessary to develop unquestionable foundational
proof of reliability. Otherwise, photographs will lose their standing as infallible witnesses and become no more useful as
substantive evidence, or even corroborative evidence, than maps or diagrams drawn by hand."
(280) But change has been glacial at best. This is not a unique problem for photography; digital imaging is only one of the technologies,
for example, for which the Manual for Complex Litigation urges judges to now establish front-end rules for the use of in the
courtroom.
(281) But even though the law cannot stop the progress of technology there are ways in which it can--and should--respond to change.
(282)
One response would be to update the Federal Rules of Evidence.(283) Many of the current definitions in the rules, which have not kept pace with technology, have the potential to "create substantial
future mischief."(284) One commentator notes that "[t]he false assumption in the FRE is that computer data is similar to other forms of information capture, such as photography."(285) But information captured digitally is never fixed; it is always subject to manipulation.(286) The Best Evidence Rule, for example, considers print-outs of data stored on computers as originals,(287) a proposition difficult to accept given that "the advent of electronic photography means the end of the photo negative [as]
tangible evidence of an event."(288) Further, unlike for a photographic negative, digital data means nothing without software to produce intelligible "output";
manipulation is inherent to the process.(289) It is true that, absent human intervention, software usually can be relied upon to produce an exact duplicate of the information
that was put into the computer. But commentators also have observed that computer users tolerate a level of "perfection" that
is relative, not absolute, and may not meet legal standards; accidental errors can be invisible and undetectable until it
is too late.(290)
Given the likely difficulties of amending the Rules,(291) a further means by which the law could respond to digital photography would be to use Rule 403 as it stands to virtually eliminate the use of photographs as evidence.(292) Citing Rule 403, one commentator suggests, courts could simply conclude that because of the potential of abuse from photographic manipulation,
photographs carry too great a danger of unfair prejudice to be admissible.(293) Others similarly conclude that the acceptance of photographs at least should be "greatly curtailed."(294) Again, not only the silent witness theory but the pictorial testimony theory ultimately rely on the infallibility of the
photographic process.(295) One commentator asserts that in fact photographs are rarely necessary;(296) in decisions of the Supreme Court, they never have been indispensable(297) ; further, any prejudice is likely to be serious.(298) This approach would be drastic, however. Intuitively, it seems unlikely that Supreme Court cases are a representative sampling; curtailment might disallow authentic and valuable evidence, even while still allowing
fabrications to be admitted.(299) Further, commentators doubt that the problem is so serious that courts have to resort to such an extreme measure--at least
at the present time.(300)
A less drastic alternative would be to broaden the scope of review given to photographs before they are admitted under
the Rules,(301) although the trade-off would inevitably be that the measures would be less effective. For example, the determination of the
relevance and authentication of photographic evidence currently rests within the trial court's discretion and will not be
overturned absent a clear abuse of that discretion.(302) But if, or so long as, the courts are unable to detect fakery, such deference by appeals courts may not be warranted; de
novo review could be justified. Another enhancement would be for courts to require that potentially misleading computer-generated
images be conspicuously labeled, to avoid any misrepresentation to the court.(303) An analogy lies in that if courts admit posed photographs,(304) vigorous authentication is required.(305) But if the primary concern is intentional deception, such a standard might have little practical effect. Further,
it might not derail the emotional impact of images on factfinders,(306) even if, as some commentators recommend, courts adopt detailed jury instructions, tailored to a variety of evidentiary contexts,
to ameliorate the potential effects of possibly misleading or prejudicial evidence.(307) In addition, no one has even proposed a comparable set of instructions or guidelines for judges themselves, who are also
susceptible.(308) Commentators have noted with concern that courts confuse photographic representations of fact with facts themselves.(309)
Another response might be to limit the authentication of photographs to the photographer himself; it would, at least in
theory, ensure that photographs are not manipulated without the photographer's knowledge, and that no "new" image is later
misrepresented as the original.(310) But again, this solution seems drastic--as well as dependent on that photographers recall in perfect detail the images they
create.(311) Alternatively, the courts could require the demonstration of chain of custody.(312) Although the authentication of movie film historically has resembled that of photographs,(313) courts once suggested that proof of chain of custody might be required,(314) although this condition was later abandoned.(315) Indeed, even today some commentators recommend that lawyers demand the negative from which any proffered photograph was made:
"Some startling discoveries are frequently made."(316) To that end, some commentators recommend that law enforcement and public safety agencies establish standard operating procedures
to dispel any doubt about the integrity of digital imagery for evidentiary purposes.(317)
A further alternative would be to retain existing authentication processes, but to require the stricter questioning of
any authenticating witness--"special care,"(318) in the words of one commentator--so that the court may determine the probability that an image has been altered and shape
its inquiry and decision in regard to its admissibility appropriately.(319) Questions or topics of inquiry might include: who took the image;(320) what is the photographer's relationship to the issue in question;(321) how else might the image have been constructed;(322) is the use of the image in court related to the use for which it was made;(323) do the claims of the parties rest on the same notions of photographic meaning;(324) and are the narratives of witnesses reconcilable with--or relevant to--what is represented tangibly in a photograph.(325) But again, this approach does not resolve all possible difficulties; an authenticating witness may be untruthful. But, as
Wigmore notes, an untruthful witness is at least more a problem of perjury than photography.(326)
If the pictorial testimony theory were to be made subject to greater constraints than today, because a photograph cannot
or should not be taken at face value,(327) then almost inevitably the silent witness theory could not continue to be utilized as presently constituted either. But the
theory potentially could be rebuilt, on a new foundation. Wigmore claimed that x-rays were admissible, despite their lack of a testimonial sponsor, under a different standard than that for ordinary photography:(328) "[T]hat the instrument or process is known to be a trustworthy one."(329) Further, Wigmore indicated that the principles for the admission of x-rays "may serve as useful guidance for other new technologies."(330) If there is a bona fide doubt that an image is authentic, one should evaluate: the status of the particular instrument used;(331) the qualifications of the witness operating the instrument and taking the photograph;(332) and the operator identify the person or object photographed.(333) Further, a witness should identify the photograph and the conditions at the time the photograph was taken.(334) Such a test, based on the principles of Wigmore, could permit the continued admission of photographs without a testimonial
sponsor. The test is a sliding scale: The weight to which photographic evidence is entitled increases as the number of reliability
indicia increase.(335) Commentators in fact have noted the relative merits of this test compared to the Frye(336) test; Wigmore's principles are not handicapped by ambiguity and a fundamental failure to account for the advance of technology.(337) But still, as above, the test may do little to stop and deter intentional fakery.
A conventional means by which to attack the veracity of a photograph is to allege that standard procedures were not followed.(338) Even though chain of custody is not a requirement today,(339) it is therefore already good practice for parties to document the history of any digital image, adopting standard operating
procedures.(340) First, images should be recorded in a medium that cannot be altered, such as a CD, and stored as any other evidence for which
a chain of custody is maintained.(341) Second, images should include information regarding their creation, such as the camera's make, model and serial number, camera
settings, and the date and time the image was captured.(342) Third, anyone who prepares exhibits for courts should be trained in digital image processing, and know which images may require
a notation that changes are not prejudicial.(343) Fourth, rigorous procedures should be established for the entering of works-in-progress into file systems; if an image is
manipulated, there should be an "audit trail" of how an image was changed, to dispel any claim of impropriety.(344)
Yet, none of the above courses of action can provide a complete solution in a world of digital imagery. As do most of the
approaches above, the suggested operating procedures assume honest actors. But even police, for example, differ on what is
acceptable conduct in regard to photographs. A former Chief Inspector of the Birmingham, England police wrote that "[p]hotographs made for the purpose of crime detection or for production in any court proceedings should
not be retouched, treated or marked in any way."(345) But, as discussed above, digital imaging has proven itself as a forensic tool in large part because of how easily it can
alter images.(346) Further, the above proposed standard operating procedures assume that evidence will only be admitted under the pictorial
theory: "Imagery is not evidence. . . . Ultimately, evidence in a police case revolves around the integrity and veracity of
the witness presenting the image, who must demonstrate its authenticity to the court."(347) This does not reflect reality.
But the fact that there is no perfect solution does not excuse the law from taking action. Already courts are considering
cases which, while not reaching full implications of digital forgery, have come very close to doing so; in two recent cases,
courts considered the propriety of using digital technology to enhance self-authenticating photographs. In State of California v. Phillip Lee Jackson,(348) a set of fingerprints at a crime scene proved difficult to evaluate through conventional methods.(349) A digitally-enhanced image was introduced; a computer adjusted the photograph's brightness, contrast, size, and color, allegedly
without damaging the integrity of the prints.(350) The photograph was ruled admissible.(351) Similarly, in State of Washington v. Eric Hayden, a suspect set of palm prints were digitally enhanced.(352) In both cases, standard operating procedures were used to ensure the integrity of the process; for example, examiners had
not seen the direct print of the defendants, so the likelihood of fakery and frame-up was minimal.(353)
The above cases demonstrate that the need for action at a higher level is inevitable. Digital technology is in many ways
fundamentally at odds with notions of evidence; electronic media are designed to be reused, with no equivalent to the permanently
archived, physically unique photographic negative.(354) The law should confront this challenge directly, rather than let it play out haphazardly, in ad hoc d